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S P E C T A T O R ' S J

Spooks and Scholars

Its name is the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). Its 25 founding members are academics drawn primarily from the social sciences.* Its existence dates from the spring of 1979, a time when U.S. intelligence agencies, the CIA and FBI in particular, had been in the doghouse for several years. Some members of Congress and then-Vice President Walter Mondale were even prepared to lock up the doghouse for good and throw away the key.

It is no exaggeration to say that this assault on the CIA and FBI—indeed, upon the very concept of intelligence itself—marked the first time, certainly in modern history, that the leadership of a large country deliberately undertook a campaign of unilateral intelligence disarmament at the same time that another country, a sworn adversary, was multiplying its intelligence armament.

We will never fully know what this anti-intelligence campaign meant to American security—and what it still means. In the light of ever-increasing Soviet KGB activity, however, some of which was detected by depleted U.S. counterintelligence forces and some exposed by sheer accident, e.g., the Falcon and the Snowman, it is safe to assume that for almost a decade the KGB never had it so good. Hence, the CSI's underlying theme, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s": What can be done to restore the structures of U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence to some effectiveness?

Intelligence, of course, is one of the most misunderstood functions of democratic governments, particularly in the United States where the CIA is barely 35 years old. A major cause of this mis-

versities to include, as part of their curriculum, any discussion of intelligence and its relation to the government's decision-making machinery. Intelligence has been a no-no, the untouchable, unteachable area in the academy, despite the fact that intelligence—for good or ill—is integral to the foreign policy of any modern nation. One reason—ideology notwithstanding—for the paucity of academic research on intelligence has been that reliable information about the elements of intelligence has hitherto been unavailable, aside from sensational exposés by former agents such as Philip Agee, Thomas Braden, Victor Marchetti, and others. Certainly, what information was available until the mid-1970s would hardly have met acceptable standards for a doctoral dissertation. However, a flood of material, formerly classified, became publicly available in the wake of House and Senate intelligence committee investigations, new legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act, and the presidential guidelines for the CIA and FBI.

The academics who formed CSI were no experts in intelligence; they were teachers of law, history, and political science concerned that neither they nor the informed public, nor even the intelligence community itself, understood the function of intelligence in an open society. They proposed two tasks for the Consortium: first, to encourage objective, scholarly, unclassified research into the relationship between intelligence, foreign policy, and U.S. decision-making; second, to provide "an institutional focus for a balanced, coherent understanding of the role of intelligence in a free society."

Underlying these themes is a consensus that intelligence is not some luxury a democratic government can do without, even though it can be argued that a successful intelligence establishment in a democratic society is virtually impossible to come by. While some issues in public life can be envisioned as solvable—"solutions" to poverty, busing, abortion, recession—the functioning of the CIA or the FBI in a free society is not one of them.

The main difficulty today derives from the fantasy that we can somehow pass a law to establish an intelligence agency composed of nature's noblemen, and that under the supervision of keen-eyed, close-mouthed congressional oversight committees everything will work out as it should.

Unfortunately, all my years of study have convinced me that there are no two ways about it. You either believe in the need for a CIA despite all the concomitant problems and the CIA's own self-inflicted wounds, or you do not, preferring rather "spy-in-the-sky" surveillance of the USSR, which is about as valid as promises of "pie-in-the-sky."

*Among the academics are Professors Adda B. Bozeman, Samuel P. Huntington, John Norton Moore, Robert Nisbet, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Richard E. Pipes, Antonin Scalia, Paul Seabury, Allen Weinstein, and James Q. Wilson. Professor Roy Godson of Georgetown University and the National Strategy Information Center has been CSI coordinator from its inception.

Arnold Beichman, a founding member of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, will be a visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution this fall.